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Abstract:  
The traditional authentication system used in technological applications is the well-known and widely spread user/password 
pair. This technology as proved itself as well acceptable by the users and quite safe when used according to good security 
practices, this is: frequent change of the password; use of letters, number and symbols in the password; not revealing the 
password to others; not using the same password in more then one service; etc. But this is not what really happens, so we 
need to improve the protocol. Graphical secrets present lots of advantages and can increase the level of security without a 
significant change in the users habits. For that, we need to possess strong ways to convert them into strings that will fed the 
implemented passwords systems. In this paper we present a method to do so.  
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Introduction 
 
In the context of Information Systems (IS), authentication is the process of confirming 
an alleged identity and it differs from the identification process in which a user is linked to a 
known identity [1]. Authentication involves, traditionally, sharing a secret with the 
authenticating entity and presenting it whenever a confirmation of the user’s identity is 
needed. In the digital era that secret is commonly a username/password pair and/or, 
sometimes, a biometric feature, both presenting difficulties of different kinds once the first 
has known vulnerabilities and the second has many issues related to ethical and social 
implications of its use [2].   
 Password vulnerabilities come from their misuse that, in turn, results from the fact 
that they need to be both easy to remember, therefore simple, and secure, therefore complex. 
Consequently, it is virtually impossible to come up with a “good” password [3]. On the other 
hand, once users have not yet completely realized the need for securing their authentication 
secrets, even fairly good passwords become a threat when the security policies (if at all 
existing) fail to be implemented. The results of an inquiry made by the authors in 2004 to 
sixty Information Technology (IT) professionals show that, even among those that have 
technical knowledge, the need for passwords security is underestimated.  
Table 1 - The distribution of the passwords constitution shows a generalized vulnerability 
Constitution of the passwords Users (%) 
Letters and symbols 0% 
Numbers and symbols 0% 
Letters, numbers and symbols 17% 
Only letters 23% 
Only numbers 17% 
Letters and numbers 43% 
Number of persons that know one of the user's 
passwords
48%
32%
13%
7%
Zero
One
Two
Three or more
s Figure 1 - Users have a generalized tendency to share their password 2
As shown in the table 1, only 17% of the inquired professionals use complex codes 
including symbols, and 72% stated that they rarely change their access codes (figure 1), 
despite 52% of them know that at least one of those is known by at least one other person 
(figure 2). This need for simplicity and the principle of trust that allows a user to have the 
password on a post-it placed under the keyboard or even on the monitor, creates a security 
breach that can be stopped by graphical secrets (passgraphs), once they are easier to 
remember [9] [10], they can generate complex passwords (an easy way to assure easy 
compatibility with existing systems) and they are difficult to transmit from person to person. 
This need to stop the transmissibility of the authentication secrets is even bigger when we 
realize (figure 3) that most professional users (65%) have only one or two codes that they use 
for authenticating to the generality of the used services.  
Passwords change frequency
5%
0%
23%
42%
30% At least once a month
Once each trimester
Once each semester
Almost never
Never
Figure 2 - Most of the users rarely change their passwords 
Number of passwords frequently used
42%
23%
35%
One Two Three or more
Figure 3 - Most of the user use the same password for accessing all services 
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Needless to say that the authentication processes based on passgraphs are, like virtual 
keyboards, adequate for use in private spaces or in small devices like the Personal digital 
Assistants (PDAs), once they are vulnerable to eyesdroping. Giving to the user the possibility 
to choose at each login attempt between the passgraph mode and the password mode is not a 
choice either, once the system would inherit the vulnerabilities of both systems, so the only 
way to implement this systems without limiting the users is to allow the user a choice 
between the system when he uses the system for the first time (enrolment) and making that 
choice definitive (or almost). In this case, the user must be educated for the advantages and 
disadvantages of both systems so that he can make the choice that best suites is needs. 
Anyway, in order to provide an easy widespread of passqraph systems and to take advantage 
of the security infrastructures already deployed they must be compatible with the existing 
systems, without generating new vulnerabilities. This can be achieved by generating strong 
passwords from the users passhraph choices using the one-way function described on this 
paper. 
 
Previous work on passgraphs 
 
Greg Blonder was the first to describe graphical passwords [4], presenting in a United 
States Patent a system that would allow users to choose their picture, the number of regions 
to be clicked, their size and position. Since then, many variations of this system were 
presented and images have gained their way into the authentication processes.  
Among the most popular graphical authentication systems we find PassfacesTM from 
the Passfaces Corporation, a commercial system were the user chooses a previously selected 
face from a set of faces and repeats this process for different faces in different sets for a 
defined number of times [5], but popular doesn’t imply secure and a study of the users 
choices demonstrated that they are, in some cases, similar for all users. For instance, 10% of 
the passwords of males could have been guessed with only two attempts [6]. 
The Déjà Vu Scheme inn which a matrix of m images is set, where n images are part 
of the user’s portfolio, previously chosen from a set of proposed images. The user must 
identify those n images to login. 
The draw a secret (DAS) scheme is a graphical authentication system with an 
approach completely different. In DAS the user draws something over a grid and that 
becomes is authentication secret. This system has been implemented with success in PDAs 
and further studies will be made to analyse the user’s choices and acceptance [7].  
In the Visual Identification Protocol (VIP) several possibilities were created. From a 
set of ten predefined images the user chooses four, placed on the same place and typed in the 
same order (VIP1) or placed in random positions (VIP2). VIP3 is a process where four of the 
eight images existing in the user’s portfolio are displayed along with 12 distractors and the 
user must identify them in no particular order.  The studies shown that the most common 
errors associated with VIP1 and VIP2 were related with bad sequences, when the identified 
images are correct but selected on the wrong order, and in VIP3 most of the errors were due 
to wrong identification of the images, for instance any flower being consider as “the” chosen 
flower [8]. 
 
Description of the implemented system 
 
Considering that the PDA is the technology that provides an environment that better 
takes advantage of the graphical authentication procedures and that the Word Wide Web is 
the most used distributed system, our system was designed to meet the authentication 
demands of a Mobile Web Service, especially web pages destined to be browsed in PDAs.  
 4
In order to test the authentication process in a real life situation we transformed the 
login procedure of the site of a graduation course, normally protected by password for 
copyright reasons and to protect the privacy of the students in matters like their grades. We 
use the Web Application Server PE 8, from SUN, for a regular file realm authentication 
invoked through a hidden field in a regular form. The created environment feeds this field 
with a string that results from the application of a function (described later) to the passgraph 
data. The security issues were then addressed in the same way that for a regular 
username/password authenticated site.  
Both the enrolment and the authentication environment consist on a window with a 
field for a username, in this case the student number; a dialog panel, where the users get 
feedback from the system; and a select panel, where the user can choose the active image 
from a previously defined set. Each image includes a grid in which each area can be seen as a 
pair (letter, number) once the first line has letters and the firs column has numbers letter A in 
the first position, equivalent to the line zero. In the first stage the image was divided in a 
20x15 grid (figure 4) but, now that our community is getting familiar with passgraphs, we’ll 
use a cc grid in the next implementation. This way we can place the entire alphabet on the 
first line.  This configuration was chosen in order to find out if the users would prefer a 
password scheme, instead of a graphical scheme. If this were the case, the user would just 
pick a sequence of letters. On the other hand, this can also be used (with a full alphabet) for 
entering the username without the use of an external keyboard (virtual or physical). The user 
chooses an authentication secret by clicking on several points of the active image, which can 
be changed at any time. The sequence of the picked points in the chosen images will be the 
authentication key for future logins. The first implementation was conceived to fully 
understand the users free choices; therefore no limitations were imposed to the length of the 
passgraph.  In the dialog panel the symbol * appears whenever the user selects a region of the 
image, allowing it to know if he did in fact clicked or if he accidentally clicked twice. In this 
way we’ll be able to reduce the number of login errors due to accidental clicks. In the final 
enrolment implementation, this panel will also transmit information about the limitations that 
will be made to the length of the passgraph. The new web site has now a limitation to the size 
of the passgraph, being four the smallest selected sequence. 
Figure 4 - The enrolment and authentication window 
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The process 
 
 The use of several images (so far we have always used the same four images) creates 
a third dimension factor once a passgraph with length n will be a vector of the type 
(p1, p2,…, pn) where, considering I as the set of available images,  { }I#1   ,130  ,190|),,( ≤≤≤≤≤≤∈ zyxzyxp . The values of x and y define the selected 
section in a specific two-dimensional image, as shown in figure 5 for a set of four images (the 
ones used in our implementation). In order to maintain the compatibility with the traditional 
password systems, we need to generate a string. For that, we’ll use 15 tables, numbered from 
0 to 14, with 26 columns and 20 lines. So we have 7800 cells, each one with one 3 characters 
string and the corresponding ANSI code. Figure 5 is one of those tables. 
 
We find our first cell by locating the table z in line x and column y. Then, for each { }I#1   ,130  ,190|),,( ≤≤≤≤≤≤∈ zyxzyxp  we’ll do: 
 
- ( ) nesNumberOfLictedCelleviousSeleeANSIFromThzyx st  modPr1+++ to find the next line selected; 
- ( ) lumsNumberOfCoctedCelleviousSeleeANSIFromThzyx st  modPr2+++ to find the next column 
selected; 
- ( ) blesNumberOfTactedCelleviousSeleeANSIFromThzyx st  modPr3+++ to find the next table 
selected; 
 
To prevent the possibility of discovering the sequence of clicks from the string if this is 
compromised, for instance by capturing the packages on a non-encrypted network, we need 
to make some final changes in the string. In this way, frequent changes in the tables (and the 
correspondent passwords) can increase the level of security of the system, in a transparent 
way to the user that will continue to click in the same places of the same figures. 
Let x be the ANSI code of the first element of the so far generated string. Given t = x mod n, 
will reverse the order of the first t characters. 
Let y be the ANSI code of the last element of the so far generated string.. Given k = x mod n, 
will reverse the order of the last k characters.  
For instance the generated string from a simple sequence of clicks, shown in Figure 6, is 
p”$p}sLQyNUi. 
4kQ v9; D't ~\' M'p K"| .n. @8v (!p LQi H=p j,6 h$m ,:] q;_ ]h8 D-{ -Yh `Rj T^- evf y6: i*f jJH ^sl {{T
E6W xnf :}V Sx8 e(r XT0 ;8u aWA x6w pd/ #,T t4j EwB ;!^ ElX VOU PjE br4 wch ;!I A:/ "eb D,S 8R1 8%j dQi
B`o }5N yDv y$U ;3t F`| [+- X!g yvd HdF 9XQ Wcp 2-u pEB }Tj jZI _mx f#I 5Df &)^ ?d$ up6 3:@ u=_ r<_ yjK
T~3 LZM hF7 .'V ]`d C}{ -5% ];3 qwn &!n -vf sTr lrV X3d aZn zs4 HqV l1U @v> AUs L[a ?/n OkA |S/ =s/ j<6
ZU8 xtx yT2 ekN Evy V^# )l2 2Fv <w& u{= l6L ?f0 \r. Jew 6I/ zL] `Oc zJk Ati Y&h xG\ O]^ L3E P#D 8.d tfx
!Z[ He$ 'Ot HdS QB( >,y ewC }{d ayq %+" a"} 0LY _DE NjD 53I xXV ry6 ~,Y ;l6 ({e $,8 D~2 ,Mp IL9 -zI Ad~
aC& @,H jos Hg4 e$Q (i? 0f| k;n hpS Dx$ z0& ?P3 W#f k:B &k` v#^ O/t 0)q 48a 4~! sv\ N.! gZb ~"J ?{< zaL
_~t 0lp :%S %$K bUb `f- `9( 3"' u<W HKI @m= CTQ O)H no; A-t {l# Q\) rGc 1TX |Vy `<o I7B ~Np "," 3^$ gYr
P?p x7U &^" FLn F|. ,\b 1jo 4{E L$4 _## 6Bv h8] e@J KFP cO& }SN $kS fN! b(! -%w i]/ c7` #P: ;an 2=! q^4
k2" v0n z$S v4j W?, ,yL $#u -q) &O} wZt \G| ]5B k\a BK6 Xhp m=c [(Q Tkd +!r !Y^ IMf KVf jjM rjJ tF# +v(
-md eYY t4Y aIi vI! cT6 Ml@ wsk 8Bo jES |9R #&. N.k ;?? (*V h*i 0@^ ^1" xB$ -lv <.t Kb/ V9< &2m ;.0 D#r
ZVW j.W X~O /f3 g@5 p%h rAM kuv B[9 xzb UQR 4"b gIN S6* @6} j]6 UMr z*H n.K O-H 8el <>r 4H2 t[/ p;P ZVw
WKA .y> ?"B XDw +q, OQ" DNL ]d1 9If A[7 /Y' j8\ h|1 CF* DV: tot (>~ }4H y%3 V[o _*s !5Q ey& $o\ d(% o{@
]04 e5Y $rB &q@ ~~E ?<! 3[/ ZG_ "MD 9t[ {DF |zU D`d 6B~ Z?| tjI 8o+ RFi ~W3 s7F ?Sj ]V[ `RS .5q xke dgQ
"M: OCn G%k wyv R~o 9kb 7uM gCa ,|, 2G1 'Ew CFi Ljz v+d #1& /e$ oxG -o2 U`j 3k! <2q #wE <ub Z2T Ig$ zK'
ggz t4% \a: J\2 {[_ ky> |kI K07 &6x :N: >5V }eg >L2 2su Cb^ M)( 3?T Z|* -^D gUr >Ll =C: rMS b^~ >6/ pte
W&H !bQ :Ww dbX P6U AkE `7K G#% u6V TN9 A:3 1Q( :L5 Gm- @HA 'jc Zs[ >N/ c;? n,> 0rW 5}} qQ( B3I *Bh #Ti
!~z UxU veV H~? ;b# S80 :=? HXd ^H~ y!1 Tt* .db V}7 Ff! XYt P=W iKO t-3 w1| ubN Wsk \Ko W8x vbu +q2 ]),
Ud. @yL cc[ tba 1wP sXB LGk -'A sSC dxU ~6Z A6r 7[m 1v% R'M "7] ~`k W&5 IXl 62] tDn V#R LLj pHp XHm v=G
}C! a:E <qM QG# w(@ M&, [<@ !QP yn* *D~ s2W y4@ VJ' do* TU" ,<B SRA x9t K,I DzC _6- S,8 ~Q] ).? N^} hVY
0
Figure 5 – One of the conversion tables. 
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Conclusions  
 
In this paper we present a method to generate strong authentication strings, usable in common 
user/password authentication systems. The process can generate different passwords with 
simple transformations in the conversion system and in the password files, in a transparent 
way to the user that will continue to use the usual graphical secret. 
Once again, we verify that the graphical secrets can be used in authentication with strong 
advantages to what concerns to security and without significant entropy to the users. 
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Figure 6 – The shown passgraph will generate the password p”$p}sLQyNUi. 
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